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Abstract
Large movements in exchange rates have small eects on the prices of internationally traded
goods. Using a new dataset on currency invoicing of Belgian rms, we study how the currency of
invoicing interacts with rm characteristics in shaping the extent of exchange rate pass-through at
dierent time horizons. The US dollar and the Euro are the dominant currencies in both Belgium’s
exports and imports, with substantial variation in currency choice across rms and products even
within narrowly dened manufacturing industries. We nd that smaller, nonimport-intensive rms
tend to denominate their exports in euros (producer currency pricing) and exhibit nearly complete
exchange-rate pass-through into destination currency prices at all horizons. In contrast, the largest
most import-intensive rms, and in particular with imports denominated in US dollars, tend to
also denominate their exports in US dollars (dominant currency pricing) and exhibit very low pass-
through in the short run, which gradually increases to 40–50% pass-through at the annual horizon.
We show that these empirical patterns are in line with the predictions of a theoretical framework
featuring heterogeneous rms with variable markups, endogenous international input sourcing and
staggered price setting with endogenous currency choice. We plan to use a variant of a such model,
disciplined with the Belgian rm-level data, for counterfactual analysis of the gradual increase in
the use of the euro in international trade ows.
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1 Introduction
Large movements in exchange rates have small eects on the prices of internationally traded goods.
Using a new condential dataset on Belgium rms, which combines information on the currency invoic-
ing at the rm-product-country-month level with rm characteristics, we analyze how the currency of
invoicing interacts with rm characteristics in determining the degree of exchange rate pass-through
into export prices. It is generally dicult to obtain trade data that species the currency of invoice,
and the ones that are typically available are at the product level with no information about rm char-
acteristics, which theory emphasizes are critical for understanding the currency choice — a rm-level
decision. Therefore, the Belgium rm-product-country-level trade data with information on values,
quantities and currency of invoicing, merged with domestic datasets on general rm characteristics is
uniquely suitable for this analysis.
Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) identied rm-level variables — primarily rm size and rm
import intensity — as the main determinants of medium- and long-run exchange rate pass-through.
The theory predicts that the same characteristics must be the key determinants of the currency invoic-
ing choice of the rms, which in turn shapes the short-run exchange rate pass-through. Therefore,
incorporating currency choice into the empirical analysis of the rm-level export pricing is a crucial
step in delivering a complete picture of the dynamic patterns of exchange rate pass-through, which is
essential to resolve the puzzles surrounding the low aggregate exchange rate pass-through into prices
and the heterogeneity in pass-through rates across dierent countries and industries.
Our empirical analysis is grounded in a theoretical framework which combines heterogeneous rms
with variable desired markups (as in Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings 2018) and endogenous international
input sourcing (as in Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings 2014) and staggered price setting with endogenous
currency choice (as in Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon 2010). This framework predicts that the desired
(exible-price) exchange rate pass-through is shaped by the markup variability and import intensity
of the rm, as well as strategic complementarities in price setting with other rms in the industry.
The currency choice, in turn, is determined by the desired pass-through of the rm during the period
of price non-adjustment. Since the currency choice mechanically shapes the short-run pass-through
of the rm, it feeds back — by means of strategic complementarities — into the currency choice and
price adjustment decisions of other rms aecting the equilibrium exchange rate pass-through at the
industry level. Thus, changes in the equilibrium environment — in particular related to the prevalence
in the use of dierent currencies — can have profound implications for the overall patterns of exchange
rate pass-through into export prices and international transmission of shocks.
In the data, we nd that the US dollar and the Euro are the two dominant currencies for both
Belgian imports and exports — accounting for over 90% of import invoicing and nearly 90% of export
invoicing. Therefore, producer (source) currency pricing (PCP) is uncommon for Belgian imports and
local (destination) currency pricing (LCP) is uncommon for Belgian exports. Thus the invoicing patterns
in the data do not t well with the conventional international macro models with exogenous PCP or
LCP alternatives, but rather t the framework with endogenously emerging dominant currencies —
namely, the dollar as the global dominant currency and the euro as the regional dominant currency.
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The recent literature has emphasized the dominance of the US dollar in international trade ows (see
e.g. Gopinath 2016). However, the detailed empirical evidence has largely focused on countries which
almost exclusively rely on the dollar in both their exports and their imports: e.g., Gopinath, Itskhoki,
and Rigobon (2010) examine the evidence for the US and Casas, Díez, Gopinath, and Gourinchas (2016)
study the case of Colombia. The euro, being rather a regional currency, is not used intensively in trade
ows of these countries. The advantage of studying a Euro country, which is unique to our work, is
that we have a much greater variation in currency choice, with the euro used at least as intensively as
the dollar. Furthermore, this focus allows us to shed light on the interactions between two dominant
currencies — an established global leader and a regional contender.
We nd that, for Belgian exports, the euro dominates in accounting for the overall count of trans-
actions, yet it plays a roughly equal role with the US dollar in value terms, reecting that the larger
rms adopt the dollar and the smaller rms predominantly use the euro. This pattern is less prevalent
with imports, since large Belgian rms source from both small and large foreign suppliers. The varia-
tion across destination countries and detailed industries accounts for less than a half of the variation in
the currency use across rm-product-destination-months (corresponding to observations in our panel
dataset). In contrast, the variation across rms within industry-destinations accounts for over half of
the overall variation in the currency use in our panel. The currency choice is very persistent, and the
variation over time is largely absent. These patterns justify our focus on the rm-level analysis of the
joint determination of the currency choice and exchange rate pass-through.
We nd that the import intensity of the rm and the size of the rm (measured by rm employment)
are the prime determinants of the currency choice in our micro-level panel dataset. In particular, small
rms with no imported inputs tend to denominate their exports in euros and exhibit nearly complete
exchange-rate pass-through into destination currency prices at all horizons. In contrast, large import-
intensive rms, and in particular with imports denominated in the US dollar, tend to denominate their
exports in the US dollar (dominant currency pricing) and exhibit very low pass-through in the short
run, which gradually increases to 40–50% pass-through at the annual horizon. Currency choice by
competitor rms is another empirical determinant of the rm’s currency choice and pass-through,
emphasizing the role of strategic complementarities in currency choice and pricing decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We nish the introduction with a brief description
of the related literature on currency choice. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework and derives
the estimating equations for currency choice and exchange rate pass-through. Section 3 contains our
empirical analysis. It starts by introducing our dataset and describing the construction of the variables
for the empirical analysis. It then proceeds by documenting a number of stylized facts on the currency
use in import and export transactions of Belgian rms. Finally, it presents the main results of our em-
pirical analysis of exchange rate pass-through and currency choice. In Section 4 we plan to explore the
quantitative implications and counterfactuals related to the endogenous shifts in the currency choice
across rms. Section 5 concludes.
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Literature review on endogenous currency invoicing:
• Theory: one-period general framework in Engel (2006), surveying earlier models; dynamic multi-
period framework in Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010); multi-country general-equilibrium
framework in Mukhin (2017).
• Empirical evidence: Goldberg and Tille (2008), Gopinath and Rigobon (2008), Gopinath, Itskhoki,
and Rigobon (2010), Goldberg and Tille (2016), Cravino (2017), Gopinath (2016), Boz, Gopinath,
and Plagborg-Møller (2017), Chung (2016), Casas, Díez, Gopinath, and Gourinchas (2016), Chen,
Chung, and Novy (2018), Auer, Burstein, and Lein (2018)
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we draw on new insights developed in the recent literature to provide a unied theo-
retical framework of currency choice and exchange rate pass-through in order to derive a structural
empirical framework. We consider an industry equilibrium in a given industry s in foreign destination
k. In what follows, we omit notation s and k when it causes no confusion, and we focus on a problem
of a given home (Belgian) rm i exporting to market k. In particular, we consider in turn the rm’s
desired price, its optimal preset price and optimal currency choice.
Desired price Firm i’s prot from exporting to destination k at price p∗i in the destination currency
is denoted by Πi(p∗i ) = Πi(p∗i |Ω), given the state of the world Ω. The state of the world includes the
exogenous shocks (e.g. productivity), the endogenous shocks (e.g. exchange rate movements) and the
prices of the rm’s competitors. The log desired price of rm i in the destination currency is given by:
p˜∗i = arg max Πi(p
∗
i ). (1)
That is, p˜∗i = p˜∗i (Ω) is the price that the rm would choose if it were setting prices exibly.
In the producer currency (euro), the log desired price is:
p˜i = p˜
∗
i + e, (2)
where e = ek is the log bilateral exchange rate of euro with the currency of the destination country
k. Following convention, an increase in e denotes a depreciation of the home currency (euro) and an
appreciation of the destination currency. More generally, we can express the desired price in any other
currency ` as:
p˜`i = p˜
∗
i + e− e`, (3)
where e` is the bilateral exchange rate of euro with currency `. In particular, we will be interested in
the case where ` = d, corresponding to the US dollar, the common vehicle currency.
The desired price denes the desired markup of the rm µ˜i, which satises:
p˜i = µ˜i +mci, (4)
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where mci is the marginal cost of the rm in the producer currency. We follow Amiti, Itskhoki, and
Konings (2018) and adopt the following decomposition of the change in the desired price of the rm,
which applies across a general class of models of monopolistic and oligopolistic competition:
dp˜i =
1
1 + Γi
dmci +
Γi
1 + Γi
d(z∗k + e) + εi, (5)
where z∗k is the competitor price index in the destination currency (in a given industry-destination),
εi is the demand (markup) shock, and Γi is the elasticity of the desired markup with respect to price,
Γi ≡ −∂µi/∂pi. As a result, 1/(1 + Γi) is the own cost pass-through elasticity of the rm and the
coecient Γi/(1 + Γi) reects the strength of strategic complementarities in price setting.
We dene the desired pass-through of the rm as the elasticity of the desired price p˜i with respect
to the exchange rate e:1
ψ˜i ≡ dp˜i
de
=
1
1 + Γi
ϕi +
Γi
1 + Γi
(1−Ψ∗k), (6)
whereϕi = dmci/de is the exposure of the rm’s marginal cost to the exchange rate and Ψ∗k ≡ −dz∗/de
is the response of the industry-destination price index to the exchange rate (in the destination currency).
We assume that rm idiosyncratic shocks are orthogonal to the exchange rate (E{dεi/de} = 0).
For convenience of interpretation, we can rewrite (6) as:
ψ˜i = ϕi +
Γi
1 + Γi
[(1−Ψ∗k)− ϕi].
Firms with no cost exposure to the exchange rate (ϕi = 0) and zero markup elasticity (Γi = 0) have a
zero desired pass-through in the producer currency (ψ˜i = 0). Note that this case corresponds to com-
plete pass-through in the destination currency, with the destination-currency desired price p˜∗i moving
one-to-one with the exchange rate. As soon as either the rm’s marginal cost moves with the exchange
rate (ϕ∗i > 0) or it has strategic complementarities in price setting with other rms supplying the
market (Γi > 0), the rm’s desired pass-through is positive in the producer currency (ψ˜i > 0), or
equivalently the pass-through is incomplete in the local destination currency.2
Lastly, in a broad class of oligopolistic and monopolistic competition models, the markup elastic-
ity Γi is increasing with the size of the rm, and in particular with the destination-specic market share
of the rm: Γi = Γ(S∗i ) with Γ′(·) > 0 (see Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014, 2018)). For example,
in the Atkeson and Burstein (2008) oligopolistic competition model with CES demand, under the as-
sumption of the Cobb-Douglas preference aggregator across sectors, the markup elasticity is simply
Γi = (ρ− 1)S∗i , where ρ > 1 is the within-industry elasticity of substitution.
Price stickiness and preset prices We consider a single-period model with a period of arbitrary
length ∆, with ∆ = 1 corresponding to an annual horizon, and denote with θ the annual Calvo proba-
bility of price adjustment. Hence, over a period of arbitrary length ∆, pi∆ = 1−e−θ∆ is the probability
1Note that it is not a causal response, but rather a measure of equilibrium comovement between two endogenous variables.
2Also note that the local price stability in the destination market corresponds to Ψ∗k ≈ 0. This makes the markup adjust-
ment of rm i approximately given by Γi
1+Γi
(1− ϕi).
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of price adjustment and 1 − pi∆ = e−θ∆ is the probability of no price adjustment. Note that for a
small ∆, we have pi∆ ≈ θ∆, an approximation that we use for convenience. Our analysis generalizes
to a fully dynamic model as in Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010; henceforth GIR) and a model of
state-contingent price adjustment as in Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010).
The rm presets its price before the shocks in Ω are realized, and it then faces the Calvo probability
of not being able to adjust the preset price once it observes the shocks. If the rm presets its price in
currency of country `, we denote the preset price p¯`i , so that the corresponding destination-currency
price upon the realization of the exchange rates {e, e`} is pi = p¯`i + e` − e. Note that ` can correspond
either to the destination (local) currency (with e` = e), the producer currency (euro; with e` = 0), or
the vehicle currency (dollar; with e` = ed). We use the conventional abbreviations LCP, PCP and DCP,
respectively, for these three currency pricing regimes. The preset price in currency ` solves:
p¯`i = arg max
p¯`i
EΠi(p¯`i + e` − e|Ω), (7)
where the expectation is taken over the possible realizations of the state vector Ω. Apart from theDCP
case with ` = d, we emphasize two special cases, namely PCP with e` = 0 and LCP with e` = e, and
we use the following notation for the optimal preset prices in these two cases respectively:
p¯i = arg max
p¯i
EΠi(p¯i − e) and p¯∗i = arg max
p¯∗i
EΠi(p¯∗i ).
Without loss of generality, we normalize the expected values of exchange rates to zero,Ee=Ee`=0.
We can then prove the following result (See Proposition 1 in GIR and its generalization to DCP in
Mukhin 2017):
Lemma 1 (Preset prices) The rst-order approximation to the optimal preset prices satises:
p¯i = p¯
∗
i = p¯
`
i = E{p˜`i + e` − e} = E p˜∗i for any currency `. (8)
In words, under any currency choice, the rm chooses its preset price to target the expected desired
price dened in (1). Intuitively, this is a certainty equivalence principle: if exchange rates are random
walks (in a dynamic version of the model), then (8) is the law of one price parity condition for price
setting, which corresponds to the prot-maximizing preset prices under dierent currency choices.3
Currency choice With this setup, we can now consider the currency choice ` of a rm, which it
makes at the same time as setting the preset price p¯`i , and before it observes the shocks in Ω. Formally,
3Note that this theoretical result corresponds to a hypothetical counterfactual of exogenously changing the currency
choice for a given rm pricing in a given destination market. The empirically documented violations of the law of one price
correspond either to the variation across rms (see e.g. GIR) or the variation in prices of a given rm across destination
markets (see e.g. Fitzgerald and Haller 2014).
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the optimal currency choice solves:4
` = arg max
`
{
max
p¯`i
E Πi(p¯`i + e` − e|Ω)
}
. (9)
Following the insights in Engel (2006), GIR and Mukhin (2017), this complex problem with a general
prot function Πi(·) can be shown to be approximately equivalent to a simpler problem, connecting the
currency choice to the covariance properties of the desired price with the exchange rates. Specically,
we have:
Lemma 2 (Currency choice) Under a second-order approximation to the general prot function Πi(·),
the optimal currency choice in (9) is equivalent to:
` = arg min
`
{
var
(
p˜`i
)}
= arg min
`
{
var
(
p˜∗i + e− e`
)}
. (10)
In words, the optimal currency of pricing ` ensures the minimal variation in the desired price p˜`i
expressed in currency `. This might at rst appear as a surprising result, nonetheless, it is very intuitive
on reection. The preset prices attempt to target the desired price (see Lemma 1). When the desired
price expressed in currency ` is very volatile with the exchange rate changes, currency ` is a poor
choice for presetting the price as it will result in large prot losses across dierent states of the world.
In contrast, when the desired price is very stable in a given currency `, xing the price in this currency
results in little loss relative to the exible price setting, which explains the result in Lemma 2.
Note that the variance term in (10) can be expanded as a sum of the variances and covariances,
which then can be combined into a linear regression coecient of the desired price with the exchange
rate (see Engel 2006 and GIR). For concreteness, consider producer currency pricing (PCP), which is
adopted by the rm if var
(
p˜i
)
= min`
{
var
(
p˜`i
)}
. Since p˜i = p˜∗i + e, this choice is favored when
the desired price in destination currency p˜∗i strongly (negatively) comoves with the bilateral exchange
rate e, corresponding to high (nearly complete) pass-through into the export-destination price. That
is, if ψ˜i = ∂p˜i/∂e ≈ 0, as dened in (6), the rm chooses producer currency pricing. In contrast, with
ψ˜i  0, the PCP choice is suboptimal, and so the rm chooses either local currency or vehicle currency
pricing. Along similar lines, the choice between LCP and DCP then depends on the relative stability of
p˜∗i and p˜di .
More formally, the choice of PCP over LCP implies var
(
p˜i
)
< var
(
p˜∗i
)
= var
(
p˜i − e
)
, or equiva-
lently cov(p˜i,e)var(e) <
1
2 . Note that the left hand side in this last inequality corresponds to the unconditional
regression coecient of the desired price on the bilateral exchange rate with the destination currency,
which is approximately equal to ψ˜i dened in (6). This analysis can be extended to additional third
currencies, such that PCP is chosen when ψ˜i & 0, LCP is chosen when ψ˜i . 1, and DCP may be chosen
in the intermediate range (for further details see Mukhin 2017). We summarize these insights in the
4The analysis here goes through if the prot function Πi(·) is replaced with the joint surplus function of the supplier and
the buyer of product i, and hence the currency choice is not necessarily a unilateral decision of the supplier, but could also
be the outcome of a bilateral bargaining game.
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following stylized way:
ιi =
{
0 (PCP), if ψ˜i & 0
1 (LCP or DCP), otherwise, i.e. if ψ˜i  0,
(11)
with the desired pass-through ψ˜i dened in (6).
Exchange rate pass-through The realized exchange rate pass-through of the rm is shaped by two
forces — the currency choice if the price is not adjusted and the desired pass-through if price is adjusted.
A rm that choses PCP will have a zero (complete) pass-through into the destination (local) currency
price before it resets the price, and vice versa for an LCP rm. A DCP rm will have its short-run
pass-through in some intermediate range between zero and one. Conditional on price adjustment, the
rm will adjust according to its desired pass-through, independently of its currency choice.
Formally, we can write the realized pass-through of the rm as follows:
ψi = (1− pi∆)ιiχi + pi∆ψ˜i, (12)
where recall that pi∆ is the probability of price adjustment over a period ∆ and we introduce χi = 1
for LCP rms and χi ∈ [0, 1] for DCP rms, while for PCP rms ιiχi = 0 as ιi = 0. Therefore, (12)
combines the mechanical pass-through during the period of no price adjustment, which depends on
the endogenous currency choice, with the endogenous pass-through conditional on price adjustment.
In the short run, as ∆ and pi∆ approach zero, exchange rate pass-through is entirely determined
by currency choice. Over very long horizons, when prices are exible (1 − pi∆ ≈ 0), currency choice
should not matter directly, and can only be correlated with the observed exchange rate pass-through ψi
due to selection into currency choice based on desired pass-through ψ˜i, as emphasized in (11).
Over the short and medium run, prior to full price adjustment, currency choice has a direct eect
on the realized exchange rate pass-through of the rms in a given industry-destination. This, in turn,
feeds back into the desired pass-through of every individual rm supplying this market, as captured
by the term Ψ∗k in (6). As a result, there are strategic complementarities in the currency choice deci-
sion, and the choice ιi of any individual rm depends on the choices of its competitors ι−i. Indeed,
more rms adopting local currency pricing reduces pass-through into destination currency (lower Ψ∗k),
increasing ψ˜i and making LCP choice by any individual rm a more likely outcome.5
Estimating equations In our empirical analysis, we focus on the two key outcomes for the rm: the
currency choice ιi characterized by (6) and (11) and the realized pass-through ψi characterized in (12).
We, therefore, take the rst order approximations of these relationships, which results in our estimating
5Formally, the strategic interaction in currency choice are captured by the presence of competitor prices in the rm’s state
vector Ω. As a result, the optimality conditions for the rm’s problems in (7) and (9) characterize the rm’s best response to
the strategies of its competitors captured in Ω. The full industry equilibrium corresponds to the xed point of the currency
choice and price setting game between all rms in the industry. Our empirical focus makes it sucient to describe the rm’s
best response, leaving out the full equilibrium characterization (see Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings 2018, Mukhin 2017).
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equations. In particular, for currency choice, we estimate a linear probability specication:
P{ιi = 1} = 1
{
ψ˜i  0
} ≈ αsk + βϕi + γSi, (13)
where αsk is the industry-destination xed eect, ϕi is a measure of the rm’s cost exposure to the ex-
change rate (e.g. import intensity) and Si is a measure of the rm’s size, which proxies for the variation
in markup elasticity Γi. Equation (13) describes the within industry-destination variation in currency
choice across rms. In some specications we also control for the currency choice of the rm’s com-
petitors ι−i, which should explain part of the equilibrium variation across industry-destinations.
For the exchange rate pass-through we augment the specication in Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings
(2014) with the currency choice ιi and estimate the following price-change regression:
E∆pi ≈ ask +
[
bϕi + cSi + dιi
]
∆e (14)
As we vary the horizon ∆, we expect b and c to become signicant, and d to become less signicant.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we describe our dataset and the construction of the main variables. We then present
new stylized facts on currency invoicing and describe our main empirical results.
3.1 Data Description
The novel data we use for our analysis is the information on the currency choice at the rm-product-
country-month level for all import and export transactions from February 2017 to March 2018. The
Belgian Customs Oce only began to collect these data in a systematic way at the beginning of 2017,
which were then processed by the National Bank of Belgium. Because the Customs Oce only records
extra-EU transactions, the currency data are only available for trade transactions with countries out-
side of the European Union. All international trade transactions that take place within the European
Union are collected by a dierent authority, the Intrastat Survey, which does not report the currency
of invoicing. Importantly, we have the invoicing information for both exports and imports at the rm-
product level, with the importing side rarely observed in other datasets. For all extra-EU transactions,
we have the value, quantity and currency of invoice for exports and imports. These data are reported
at the rm level by destination and source country for each product classied at the 8-digit combined
nomenclature (CN) in values and quantities, with around 10,000 distinct products. The rst 6-digits of
the CN codes correspond to the World Harmonized System (HS).
For the baseline exchange rate pass-through analysis, we use annual data on trade ows and rm
characteristics for the period 2012 to 2017, as we are interested in studying the equilibrium relations
following the theoretical framework described in Section 2. Since our data does not include information
on the currency of invoicing prior to 2017, we take the currency of invoicing from the monthly trade
data in 2017 and 2018 and extrapolate it to the years 2012-2016. In doing so, we calculate each rm’s
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share of exports by destination invoiced in noneuro currency, and assume that it is persistent over
time in the previous 5 years.6 As the theory arguably best describes the dierentiated manufacturing
products in developed countries, our baseline focus is on the high-income non-euro trade partners
of Belgium: Australia, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland, and the United States. However, we will also present summary statistics and robustness
for the full sample of countries and industries.
The dependent variable in the exchange rate pass-through regressions is the log change in a rm
f ’s export price of good i to destination country k at time t (we omit index f for brevity), proxied by
the change in a rm’s export unit value, dened as the ratio of export values to export quantities:
∆p∗ikt ≡ ∆ log
(
Export valueikt
Export quantityikt
)
, (15)
where quantities are measured as weights or units. We use the change in the ratio of value to weights,
where available, and the change in the ratio of value to units otherwise. Despite the high degree of
disaggregation in the CN product codes, unit values may still be an imprecise proxy for prices because
there may be more than one distinct product within a CN 8-digit code resulting in some unit value
changes arising due to compositional changes within a product code or due to errors in measuring
quantities. To try to minimize this problem, we clean the data by dropping the observations with
abnormally large price jumps, namely with year-to-year price ratios above 3 or below 1/3. Summary
statistics for all variables are provided in the Appendix Table A1.
To understand the determinants of currency choice, we combine these data with rm characteris-
tics drawn from annual income statements of all incorporated rms in Belgium. This combination of
invoicing data with the rm characteristics is unique to Belgium. It is straightforward to merge these
datasets as both include a unique rm identier. In particular, we use the quarterly VAT declarations,
which all rms are required to submit to the tax oce. This comprises information on the cost of total
material inputs used. We also rely on data from the Social Security Oce, where all rms have to re-
port their employment and wages paid. Using these data, we construct two key variables: the import
intensity from outside the eurozone ϕit and the rm’s market share Sikt, following Amiti, Itskhoki, and
Konings (2014). Specically,
ϕit ≡ Total non-euro import valueitTotal variable costsit , (16)
where total variable costs comprise a rm’s total wage bill and total material cost. We usually average
this measure over time to obtain a rm-level average import intensity denoted by ϕi. Note that this
variable is measured at the rm level and applies to all products i produced by rm f .
We further split this variable by the currency of invoicing, to get a measure of the share of imports
invoiced in euros and noneuros. For the EU countries with missing currency information, i.e. the United
6For most rms, this is a zero-one dummy variable, with zero corresponding to producer-currency (euro) exports; however,
for a small share of rms, this variable takes fractional values on (0, 1), if the rm sells multiple products to a given destination
invoiced in dierent currencies.
9
Kingdom and Sweden, we assign the rm’s overall currency share to those source countries for the con-
struction of this variable. We denote the euro and non-euro invoiced import withE andX superscripts
respectively, so that the overall import intensity of the rm can be decomposed as ϕi = ϕEi + ϕXi .
The rm’s market share is constructed as follows:
Sikt ≡ Export valueikt∑
j∈Fskt Export valuejkt
, (17)
where s is the sector in which rm f sells product i and Fskt is the set of Belgian exporters to destina-
tion k in sector s at time t; the numerator (Export valueikt) measures the total exports of all products
of rm f to destination k in sector s corresponding to product i of the rm. Therefore, Sikt measures
a Belgium rm’s market share in sector s, export destination k at time t relative to all other Belgium
exporters. Note that, following the theory, this measure is destination specic. The theory also sug-
gests that the relevant measure is the rm’s market share relative to all rms supplying the destination
market in a given sector, including exporters from other countries as well as domestic competitors in
market k. But, since our analysis is across Belgian exporters within sector-destinations, the compet-
itive stance in a particular sector-destination is common for all Belgian exporters (and absorbed into
industry-destination xed eects), and hence our measure of Sikt captures all relevant variation for our
analysis. We dene sectors at the HS 4-digit level, at which we both obtain a nontrivial distribution of
market shares and avoid having too many sector-destinations served by a single rm.
3.2 Stylized facts on currency choice
We start by documenting the overall incidence of dierent currencies in imports and exports. The
currency data is available only for the extra-EU trade, which accounts for 34% of total Belgian imports
and 28% of exports. Belgian main trade partners are the EU members, and it is reasonable to assume that
the trade ows within the EU are predominantly invoiced in euros. Belgium, however, is a very open
economy, with the trade (imports plus exports) to GDP ratio of 169% in 2017, and hence its ex-EU trade
ows, while accounting for about a third of its total trade ows, are still important as a share of GDP.
In Table 1, we report the shares of currency use (for euro, dollar and other currencies combined)
in Belgian ex-EU imports and exports. We report the shares of both the observed transactions (at rm-
product-country-month level) and the value of trade ows. In exports, the euro accounts for nearly 70%
of observations, yet only 39% of the value of the trade ows, suggesting that it is the smaller transactions
that are denominated in euros. In contrast, the dollar accounts for just 21% of observations, yet almost a
half (48%) of the value of exports, making the dollar the dominant export currency. The other currencies
combined account for just over 10% of Belgian exports, both in count and in value terms. Therefore, the
incidence of local (destination) currency pricing — other than the dollar — is not very high in Belgian
exports.7
7While the US is the largest trade partner of Belgium outside the EU, it still accounts for a modest share of total Belgian
trade — namely, 7.2% of imports and 4.7% of exports. The prevalence of the US dollar in Belgian trade invoicing considerably
exceeds these shares. For example, if we drop the US as an export destination, the share of the dollar use in export invoicing
falls only from 47% to 42%. This emphasizes the dominant role of the US dollar as the vehicle currency in international trade,
10
Table 1: Currency use in exports and imports
Exports Imports
Count Value share Count Value share
share All Di Non-di share All Di Non-di
Euro 0.691 0.388 0.425 0.324 0.418 0.414 0.512 0.283
Dollar 0.207 0.475 0.374 0.645 0.495 0.501 0.354 0.701
Other 0.102 0.137 0.201 0.031 0.087 0.084 0.134 0.017
For imports, the value shares are almost the same as for exports: euro accounts for 42% of the value
of imports, dollar accounts for 49% and all other currencies combined account for 9%. For imports,
however, there is no discrepancy between the shares in terms of observations and in the value terms,
suggesting that on average there is no dierence in the size of the transactions across the three currency
bins that we consider.8 The limited role of the other currencies (accounting for under 9% of imports)
suggests that producer currency pricing — again outside of the case of the dollar — is an infrequent
phenomenon in Belgian imports.
Dierentiated goods (dened by the Rauch classication) account for about 85% of both Belgian
imports and exports by count of observations, and therefore the overall count shares reported in Table 1
also approximately equal the count shares for the dierentiated goods. In terms of value, however,
dierentiated goods account for around 60% of trade — specically, 63% of exports and 57% of imports.
Not surprisingly, for the non-dierentiated goods — many of which are commodities or homogeneous
goods — the dollar is a much more prevalent currency, accounting for 70% of imports and 65% of exports.
The role of the dollar is, however, much more modest in the dierentiated trade ows — accounting for
around 35% of both imports and exports, with the euro being more important and accounting for 43%
of exports and 41% of imports. Also note that the use of the third currencies, which are nearly absent in
the non-dierentiated trade invoicing, becomes more prevalent for dierentiated goods — accounting
for 20% of exports and 13% of imports.
Across countries What is the pattern of invoicing for exports vs imports for a given trade partner?
Grassman (1973) found that Swedish exports were mostly invoiced in Swedish kronas and Swedish
imports were mostly invoiced in the producer’s currency. The intuition behind Grassman’s law is that
a rm with more bargaining power will choose its own currency to avoid exchange rate risk. Of course,
this presumes that the exporter has more bargaining power, an assumption that would be dicult to
test given the lack of data on both sides of the transaction. Nevertheless, the Grassman’s law would
suggest that Belgian exporters are more likely to invoice their exports in euro (producer currency) than
their imports. However, we nd that this pattern does not hold in our dataset. Instead, we nd that for
each country, the euro share of Belgian imports is on average higher than for Belgian exports. We can
see this in Figure 1, where we plot each country’s share of exports invoiced in euros against the euro
consistent with the patterns documented by Gopinath (2016).
8If we focused on dierentiated goods, the share of Belgian imports invoiced in euros is 41% in count terms and 51% in
value terms (and in dollars 50% and 35% respectively), suggesting that the local currency transactions are larger on average.
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Figure 1: The use of euro and dollar: imports vs exports
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Figure 2: Dominant currencies
(a) Imports
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Note: Each circle corresponds to a country — a Belgian trade partner outside of the EU — with the size of the circles pro-
portional to the share of the country in total trade ows (exports plus imports). The import and export shares are in value
terms. The countries identied with individual colors correspond to the Belgium’s top seven trade partners. The dashed lines
identify the average currency shares across all countries, as reported in Table 1.
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share in its imports, with the size of the circle representing the relative trade. With most points below
the 45 degree line, the right panel indicates that the home currency (euro) is more commonly used for
imports than for exports. This is true even though Belgian imports are more commodity-intensive than
exports, with commodities and homogenous goods being more commonly invoiced in US dollars. One
reason that Grassman’s law fails to hold relates to the increasing use of a dominant currency in trade
transactions. This dominant currency is usually considered to be the US dollar, but it could also be the
euro, especially for the transactions involving a eurozone country on one end of the trade.
To check for the importance of a dominant currency, we plot the dollar share of imports against
the euro share of imports in the left panel of Figure 2 and provide a similar plot for exports in the right
panel. Each point denotes the currency share of trade between Belgium and a specic country, with the
size of the circles representing the relative size of the trade. The fact that most points for importing (left
panel) lie on the negative diagonal implies there is little use of a the producer currency in importing
by Belgian rms, that is imports are either invoiced in euros or dollars. Almost all countries are on
the diagonal — except for Switzerland and Japan among the main trade partners — very few major
industrial countries use their own currency when exporting to Belgium. A similar pattern, but not as
tight, appears for exports on the right panel. Again, countries lying on the negative diagonal implies
little use of a third currency, here denoting local currency, with exports mostly denominated in euros
or dollars. However, for Belgian exports there are a few more countries o the diagonal, most notably
Switzerland, Japan, Russia, China and Turkey, as well as a number of other smaller trading partners.
Variance decomposition We now explore the patterns of variation in currency choice in our panel
of rm-product-country-month observations, for both exports and imports. We dene a currency
dummy variable for rm-product i, export-destination or import-source country k, in month t:
ιikt =
{
0, if transaction is in euro,
1, otherwise, if transaction is in non-euro.
From Table 1 we know that ιikt = 1 for nearly 70% of export observations which account for about 40%
of export value. First, in the time-series dimension, we observe only 3.4% of observations that change
the currency of pricing over the 13-month period in our sample, and therefore the currency choice is a
very persistent characteristic.
Next, we explore the patterns of cross-sectional variation in currency choice — across countries,
industries and rms. In particular, in Table 2, we project the currency dummy ιikt for export observa-
tions on various subsets of xed eects, and report the adjusted R2 from a value-weighted projection.
The patterns of the results for unweighted projections and for imports are quantitatively similar, with
the share of the explained variation in the unweighted projections being somewhat lower.
Table 2 shows that the variation across destination countries accounts for a small share, under 13%,
of the variation in the currency choice in our panel. At the same time, combining the country xed
eects with industry xed eects explains around 40% (39% with 4-digit and 46% with 8-digit industry
xed eects) of the variation in the currency choice. The interaction of the country and 4-digit industry
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Table 2: Variance decomposition: exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.386 0.461 0.539 0.563 0.681
Fixed eects:
country X X X X
HS-4 industry X
HS-8 industry X
country×HS-4 X X
rm X X
Note: Value-weighted projections of a currency dummy equal to zero if the currency of a given rm-product-country-month
observation is euro and equal to one otherwise (non-euro) on dierent sets of xed eects.
xed eects accounts for 54% of variation in the currency choice in the full panel, with about half of
the variation remaining at the within country-industry level. The rm xed eects, together with the
country xed eects, explain over 56% of variation, suggesting that the rm-level variation is central
for explaining the currency choice. This is consistent with the focus of our theoretical framework on
the within-market across-rm variation in pass-through and currency choice. Lastly, the rm xed
eects combined with country×industry xed eect explain nearly 70% of the panel variation in the
currency choice, with the remaining variation at the product-country level.
3.3 Empirical Results
In this section, we rst analyze the determinants of currency choice and then estimate how the currency
choice aects the exchange rate pass-through into export prices, after controlling for other rm-level
determinants of desired pass-through, following the theoretical framework of Section 2.
Currency choice Theory suggest that currency of invoicing is an endogenous choice that depends
on the rm’s share of imported inputs in total costs ϕi and its markup elasticity Γi = Γ(Si), which is
increasing with the size (market share) of the rm. We expect that rms with low ϕi and Γi are more
likely to choose the producer currency (euros in our case). We estimate the (linear) probability of a Bel-
gium rm invoicing its exports to an OECD country in non-euros as a function of these two key rm
characteristics and report the results in Table 3. All standard errors are clustered at the rm level. The
dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the Belgian exporter invoices in non-euros and zero other-
wise. The observations are at the rm-HS8-country-month level, with about a third of the observations
invoiced in non-euros. We have a direct measure of the rm’s imported input intensity ϕi, which we
construct as the share of the rm’s non-eurozone imports in total costs. However, our measure of the
rm’s markup elasticity Γi is indirect, which we proxy with the rm’s size. In these specications,
we use the rm’s employment, averaged across 2016, as a proxy for the size of the rm.9 All of the
specications include time xed eects to absorb macroeconomic variation.
9We also experimented with the rm’s market share and, while the point estimate was positive as expected, it was not
signicant at conventional levels.
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The rst three columns of Table 3 show positive signicant coecients on ϕi and rm size, con-
sistent with theory. In column 1, which also includes destination-country xed eects to absorb any
average trends, shows that a rm with an import share that is 10 percentage points higher is 4 percent
more likely to invoice exports in non-euros; and rms that are 10% larger are 1% more likely to invoice
in non-euros. The coecient on rm size is stable across all specications. However, the coecient on
ϕi falls somewhat as we add additional HS 8-digit product xed eects in column 2 and HS4×country
xed eects in column 3.
In the next three columns, we split the overall import intensity from outside the eurozone into its
two components invoiced respectively in euros and non-euros, ϕi = ϕEi + ϕXi . We expect the portion
invoiced in foreign currencies to matter particularly strongly for the adoption of non-euros for the
rm’s exporting invoicing. Consistent with this, we nd that it is the non-euro portion of imports in
total costs that is critical for determining the currency of invoicing in exports. The more imports a
rm has invoiced in dollars the more likely it is to invoice its exports in dollars, coordinating the pass-
through into export prices with the movements in its marginal costs, aking to real hedging. As in the
rst three columns, the magnitude of this coecients falls as we include more xed eects, but remains
sizeable and signicant even when we include time and country×HS4 xed eects in column 6, where
the coecient equals 0.4.
Finally, in column 7 we explore whether the invoicing choices of a rm’s competitors within HS4-
destination inuence its own currency choice, where we include both year and country xed eects.
We nd that this coecient is positive and signicant.10
To provide a better sense of the economic signicance of the results in Table 3, we consider the
implied variation in the probability of the currency choice as its determinants vary across their empir-
ical range (reported in the Appendix Table A1). The overall extra-EU import intensity of the Belgian
exporters varies in our sample from zero at the 5th percentile to 44% at the 95th percentile, with a
mean of 13% percent. Using the estimates from the linear probability regression in column 1 of Table 3,
the variation across these percentiles of import intensity corresponds to an increase of 17.5 percentage
points in the probability of non-euro pricing of exports.11 There is a wide range of variation in the size
of the rms—the employment of Belgian exporters increases by over 500 log points from the 5th to the
95th percentile (that is, almost 200 times). Applying the estimates from Table 3, this corresponds to an
entire 50 percentage points increase in the probability of non-euro pricing comparing a small to a large
rm. In other words, euro invoicing is disproportionately characteristic of the smaller rms, as we
already anticipated with the comparison of the value-weighted and unweighted incidence of the cur-
rency use in Table 1. Finally, in the cross section of industries, the average incidence of the use of euros
by competitor rms goes up from zero at the 5th percentile to 100% at the 95th percentile. According
to our estimate of the strength of strategic complementarity in currency choice in column 7 of Table 3,
10This coecient is slightly larger if we replace country xed eects with product xed eects, but becomes insignicant
with both country and product xed eects, which end up absorbing mvost of the variation in the share of competitors’
non-euro invoicing.
11We obtain a similar range using estimates from column 4, where we split the overall import intensity by the currency of
invoicing of imports, with the share of imports invoiced in non-euros varying from zero at the 5th percentile to 27% at the
95th percentile.
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Table 4: Exchange rate pass-through
Dep. var.: ∆pikt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ekt 0.002 −0.044 −0.048 0.001 −0.048
(0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
∆ekt · ϕi 0.609∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗ 0.350∗∗
(0.187) (0.163) (0.161)
∆ekt · ϕEi 0.332 0.144
(0.266) (0.274)
∆ekt · ϕXi 0.846∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.192)
∆ekt · Sik 0.110∗ 0.098 0.094 0.110∗ 0.094
(0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
∆ekt · ιikt 0.264∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.064) (0.062)
# obs. 73,514 73,514 73,514 73,514 73,514
R2 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.063 0.064
Fixed Eects:
year X X X X X
country×HS4 X X X X X
Notes: Annual data for log change in unit values for period 2013-2017. Currency data is from monthly data
for period February 2017 to March 2018. All regressions are clustered at the country-year level.
this would increase the probability for a given rm to invoice its exports in euros by 12 percentage
points. To summarize, the determinants of currency choice that we identify in Table 3 explain a wide
range of variation in the probability of the currency use in export transactions observed in the data.
Exchange rate pass-through We explore the implications of the currency choice for exchange rate
pass-through in Table 4 by regressing the change in the annual log export price ∆pikt on the change
in the log bilateral exchange rate ∆ekt and its interactions with the pass-through determinants, as
suggested by the theory (see equation (14)). Among the determinants of the exchange rate pass-through
we include the rm’s extra-EU import intensity ϕi and its sales share within an HS4-destination, as
in Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014). Conrming our earlier ndings, column 1 shows a positive
association of the pass-through into producer prices with the rm’s import intensity and market share.
In other words, the pass-through into local prices is close to complete for small rms with zero exposure
to foreign intermediate inputs, while it is signicantly incomplete for larger exporters and exporters
that rely intensively on foreign intermediate inputs.
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In columns 2–5 of Table 4, we additionally include an interaction of the exchange rate with the
currency choice of the rm. If prices were entirely exible at this annual horizon, the currency choice of
the rm should not have any additional predictive power for pass-through beyond the determinants of
the desired pass-through of the rm. The fact that we nd a sizeable and signicant role for the currency
choice variable ιikt in shaping the rm’s exchange rate pass-through has two possible interpretations.
One, prices may still be sticky at the annual horizon that we focus on. Alternatively, prices may already
be exible, however our proxies for the desired pass-through of the rm — the import intensity and the
market share of the rm — might fail to provide an exact sucient statistic, and thus the currency choice
dummy may be proxying for the unobserved determinants of the desired exchange rate pass-through.
In column 2 of Table 4, we observe that including the currency choice dummy reduces the coecient
on the import intensity and makes the coecient on the market share insignicant. This latter eect
should not be over-interpreted though, as the size of the point estimate of the coecient goes down
very mildly and the standard error increases only slightly. However, going from euro to non-euro
currency choice is associated with a 25–30 percentage points increase in the observed exchange rate
pass-through at the annual horizon. The only dierence between column 3 and column 2 is in the
construction of the currency choice variable ιikt, which in column 3 can take fractional values in the
infrequent cases where the rm sells multiple products in the same HS8 category s to destination k and
prices them in dierent currencies. Since such cases are rare, the results barely change between the
two columns. Finally, in columns 4 and 5 we split the overall extra-EU import intensity of the rm into
the two components invoiced in euros and non-euors and, as in the currency choice Table 3, we nd
that it is particularly the import intensity in non-euros which accounts for the variation in the observed
pass-through of the rms.
To summarize, our results conrm the endogeneity of the rms’ currency choice, in line with the
predictions of the theory, as well as the role of the currency choice in shaping the observed pass-through
patterns. This feedback mechanism gives rise to strategic complementarities in the currency choice,
which create a persistent equilibrium with dominant currency pricing.
Dynamics of pass-through Lastly, we study the dynamics of pass-through by bins of currency
choice. In particular, we estimate a simple regression of the producer export price changes ∆pikt on
the change in the bilateral exchange rate ∆ekt, increasing the horizon of the changes from 4 to 12
months.12 We split all rm-product-destination observations into the PCP (euro), LCP and DCP (dollar)
currency bins. For the exports to the United States, dollar invoicing is classied as the case of LCP,
as we expect the LCP patterns of pass-through in this case. All regression are value-weighted and we
include no additional controls. Including controls does not materially change the results.
We report the results in Figure 3. The pass-through in the PCP (euro) currency bin is not statistically
dierent from zero at all horizons, and the point estimates are approximately zero starting at the six
months horizon, and noisy prior to it. This corresponds to complete pass-through into destination-
currency prices at all horizons. It is in line with our earlier ndings in Tables 3 and 4, according to which
12The regressions with shorter horizons result in very noisy estimates.
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Figure 3: Dynamics of exchange rate pass-through across currency bins
Note: The gure plots the regression coecients (and standard-error bands) from the projections of producer export price
changes ∆pikt on the bilateral exchange rate changes ∆ekt at dierent time horizons (using monthly price data), by bins of
currency choice at the rm-product-destination level. All regressions are value weighted.
small non-import-intesive rms select into producer currency pricing and exhibit complete desired
pass-through into destination prices at the annual frequency.
In contrast, the LCP rms exhibit complete pass-through into producer prices (i.e. zero pass-through
in destination currency) in the short run, which after 6 months starts to gradually fall to under 60%
pass-through at the annual horizon, and statistically dierent from 1. This is again consistent with
our earlier results, with large import-intensive rms selecting into non-euro pricing and exhibiting
incomplete desired pass-through at annual horizon. As can be expected, patterns of the DCP rms fall
in the intermediate range, with the pass-through estimated around 40% at all horizons.
Our overall results suggest that the sticky-price modeling approach we adopt in Section 2 provides
a good approximation to the currency choice, cross-sectional variation in pass-though at the annual
horizon and the short-run dynamic patterns of pass-through we observe in the data. Our earlier evi-
dence in Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) suggests that at one-year horizon and beyond, the data
does not reject exible-price models. The evidence here emphasizes the importance of sticky prices to
square the dynamic patterns of price adjustment at the sub-annual frequencies.
4 Quantitative Implications and Counterfactuals
[to be completed]
5 Conclusion
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A Additional Empirical and Quantitative Results
Table A1: Summary statistics
Variable 5 pctl Mean Median 95 pctl St Dev.
Full Sample (78,467 observations)
Change in unit value -0.66 0.01 0.00 0.69 0.36
Intermediate input import share 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.40 0.13
Intermediate input import share in EUR 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.23 0.09
Intermediate input import share in non EUR 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.28 0.10
Market Share 0.00 0.24 0.04 1.00 0.34
Intermediate input import share of industry 0.00 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.40
Current sample (138,913 observations)
Dependent variable 0.34
Intermediate input import share 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.43 0.14
log employment 2.40 5.36 5.38 7.83 1.79
Notes:
B Data Appendix
Data Sources The international data comprise transactions on intra-EU trade data collected by the
Intrastat Inquiry and the extra-EU transactions data by Customs. These data are reported at the rm
level by destination and source country for each product classied at the 8-digit combined nomenclature
(CN) in values and quantities, with around 10,000 distinct products. The rst 6-digits of the CN codes
correspond to the World Harmonized System (HS). All transactions that involve a change of "ownership
with compensation" (codes 1 and 11) are in our sample. These data include all extra-EU transactions
of rms with trade greater than 1,000 euros or whose weights are more than 1,000 kilograms - these
thresholds were reduced in 2006; and intra-EU trade with a higher threshold of 250,000 euros, with both
these thresholds raised somewhat in 2006.
The rm characteristics data are available on an annual frequency at the rm level, with each rm
reporting their main economic activity within a 5-digit NACE industry. However, there is no product
level data within rms available from this source.
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